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Commentary
More on Tax Reform
Tax revenue targeting as the anchor/or tax reform
Maine Policy Review (1997). Volume 6, Number 2
by Evan Richert
In the debate about Maine's tax structure; four deficiencies regularly come to the forefront:
•

•

•

•

We rely too heavily on property taxes. In 1966, property taxes were an estimated 44
percent of revenues from the "big three" taxes—sales, income, and property. Ideally,
property taxes would be closer to a third of those total revenues.
Tax revenues are too volatile. Tax revenues increased 1.5 to 3.0 times faster than income
during the 1980s, a period of economic growth, and fell nearly 4.0 times faster than
income during the 1991 recession. Ideally, the elasticity of revenue compared to income
would be in the1.0 to 1.2 range.
Overall tax burden is too high. Based on 1996 data for state taxes and 1994 data for local
taxes, Maine has the eighth-highest burden nationally. This is the result, as Christopher
St. James notes, of being relatively poorer in personal income than most states but
choosing "to tax ourselves higher to buy government services like education, health care,
and corrections more comparable to those in richer states."
The tax burden is not fairly distributed. While Maine's tax structure is one of the most
progressive in the nation, the bottom quintile of the state's non-elderly, married-couple
households still pay a higher share (11.6 percent) of income to state and local taxes than
any other income group.

Some of these problems are positively linked to each other. That is, solving one problem will
help solve another. For example, over-reliance on the property tax is positively correlated with a
disproportionate burden on the working poor. A shift away from the property tax to a more
progressive tax, such as on income, would ease both problems. But others are negatively linked;
solving one makes another worse. This is especially true of the connection between the stability
and the progressivity of the tax structure. The most stable tax structure tends to be the least
progressive, and the most progressive tax structure tends to be the least stable. For example, the
most stable tax structure would include taxes on essentials, such as food, the purchase of which
neither increases nor decreases precipitously during good and bad economic times. But taxing
essential stakes disproportionately from low- and moderate-income households.
This creates a monumental challenge to tax reformers. They cannot maximize all the "good"
things we'd like out of a tax structure, like progressivity and stability, because maximizing one
will tend to minimize another. Difficult choices must be made as to which goals are most
important. In the past, Maine has chosen fairness over stability, employing a steeply progressive
income tax and a narrowly based sales tax to raise state revenues. As we discovered during the
first half of the1990s, this leaves the state dangerously vulnerable during economic down turns.

At the same time, a virtually complete reliance on the property tax for local revenues has diluted
the progressiveness of the overall system, leaving the state short of the goal of tax fairness even
after seriously sacrificing stability.
The political tendency in situations in which equally admirable goals are opposed to each other is
to compromise—to find a solution that falls short of any single goal but reasonably satisfies all
of them. Finding such an optimal arrangement will be much easier if:
•

•

The overall tax burden is reduced. Problems like revenue instability and tax regressivity
are magnified when overall burdens are too high. If tax burdens were low, middle- and
upper-income households would more willingly accept a greater burden to enhance
fairness, while low-income house holds would more willingly accept taxes on some
essentials to achieve greater stability in revenues (and, hence, in the governmental
programs that assist them). But when tax burdens are high, few are willing to cede their
positions. Rather, each tends toward single-minded solutions, like tax caps, that would
maximize one goal without regard to the others.
A mechanism is found to introduce stability in a way that does not counteract
progressivity. The mechanism is self-discipline—resisting the urge to spend the surplus
during good economic times so there will be a hedge against bad economic times.

The vehicle proposed by Governor Angus S. King to lay the foundation of lower tax burden and
self-discipline is called tax revenue targeting. The Legislature's Taxation Committee carried
over for debate during the second session of the 118th Legislature a bill (LD 1824) that would
implement tax revenue targeting. This system would require the governor and Legislature, in
consultation with local governments, to establish biannually the maximum share of the state's
total personal income that could be captured by state and local taxes. Tax revenues received in
excess of the limit would be placed into the Rainy Day Fund, directed toward unfulfilled
obligations of the state to local government, or returned to tax payers. The need for tax revenue
targeting rises out of the experience of the last ten years and the volatiles, of the state's tax
structure. From 1985 co 1995, total personal income in Maine; grew by 76 percent. During the
same period, revenues from all state and local taxes increased 108percent, or 1.4 times faster
than income. As a result, the tax burden increased from10.7 percent to 12.7 percent of total
personal income—the equivalent of a half-billion additional tax dollars—and that has fostered
predictable reactions.
The need for tax revenue targeting rises out of the last ten years of violation of the states tax
structure. From 1985 to 1995, total personal income in Maine grew by 76 percent, or 1.4 times
faster than income. As a result, the tax burden increased from 10.7 percent to 12.7 percent of
total personal income-the equivalent of a half-billion additional tax dollars-and that has fostered
predictable reactions.
Tax revenue targeting is not the full answer to tax reform, but it should be its anchor. Once in
place, the political process will be much freer to find its way to some optimal combination of the
"good" things we'd like out of the state's tax structure, balancing the important goals of fairness,
stability, and equitable tax mix.

Since 1995, Evan Richert has served as director of the Maine State Planning Office, the policy
and planning arm of state government. Before being appointed by Governor Angus King, Richert
was co-owner and president of Market Decisions, Inc., a South Portland-based planning and
consulting firm.
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